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Introduction  
When I decided to learn Russian through studying abroad, I did not initially 
consider studying in Central Asia; I automatically figured that Russia was the place for 
Russian. During the 2014-2015 academic year, however, I ended up spending my time 
living in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. I originally intended to spend a semester in Kyrgyzstan 
after a semester of intensive Russian language study in Russia. Then, I received a 
scholarship that dictated that I spend the entire year in Russia. Shortly before my 
departure, however, changes in government policy meant that my scholarship would no 
longer fund study in Russia, and thus I ended up in Bishkek for the entire year. Much to 
my surprise, Russian was pervasive throughout Bishkek, and I likely learned more 
Russian that I would have in St. Petersburg or Moscow, where Westernization is 
prevalent and English speakers are common. Kyrgyzstan has zero U.S. establishments, 
including no McDonalds, and very few English-speakers. Why is Russian still so 
important in Kyrgyzstan even though there is only a 9% ethnic Russian minority in the 
country? Why did my host siblings, who were three and five years old and ethnically 
Kyrgyz, only speak Russian? Why was it that only two times during my nine months in 
Bishkek was I spoken to in Kyrgyz? Why do many ethnic Kyrgyz know Russian better 
than Kyrgyz and, even more interestingly, why is the culture in Bishkek such that the 
ethnic Russians have no need or use to learn Kyrgyz beyond the most elementary of 
levels, if at all?  
 Before going to Kyrgyzstan, I knew very little about the country. Two years ago, I 
did a brief research paper on a Chinese truck ban that Kyrgyzstan had enacted, so I knew 
that it was a geopolitically intriguing region, but the culture was relatively unknown to 
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me. I had heard that Russian was still the language of business, and that there would be 
ample opportunity to practice Russian. I really was not expecting the extent of Russian 
that pervades everyday society. Even the Kyrgyz language itself has been penetrated by 
Russian words: mashina is car in Russian and now is accepted as the Kyrgyz word for 
car, and bukhgalter, although originally a Russian loanword from German, is now a 
loanword for accountant from Russian to Kyrgyz.  
 In the upcoming chapters, I will look at the continued presence of Russian within 
Kyrgyzstan and how it is linked to Kyrgyz foreign policy and Kyrgyzstan’s international 
political agenda. This question arises from my time in Kyrgyzstan. When I visited other 
Former Soviet Republics within Central Asia and Europe, such as Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, I could get by with Russian, but it was neither 
expected nor necessarily appreciated (excluding, perhaps, in Kazakhstan). More than 
once, especially by those who were sixty years old or older, I was told that they knew 
Russian but they would not speak it. Instead, they would mime or speak with me in 
extremely broken English or German. Why is this refusal to use Russian the case in so 
many places, when the Russian language is so normalized in Kyrgyzstan? Is popular 
opinion on language use related to demographics, history, geopolitics, or a combination 
thereof? Only four countries have Russian as an official or state language (Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus), but what led to the normalization of Russian in 
some states of the former Soviet bloc while other states have restricted Russian’s 
presence altogether?  
 Chapter One will investigate the history of language policy in Kyrgyzstan, 
specifically between 1920 and 1991. It will also delineate the formation and 
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implementation of different language schools and language learning methods pre-1991, 
the year the Soviet Union broke up and Kyrgyzstan became an independent country. I 
will discuss the usage and presence of various languages in Kyrgyzstan at the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and also how Kyrgyzstan and the current ‘Kyrgyz’ ethnic identity was 
formed.  
 Chapter Two will look at the Russian and Kyrgyz languages and their influence in 
Kyrgyzstan, specifically within the government since 1991 (both in domestic and foreign 
affairs). In addition to the official and state languages, this chapter will also discuss the 
presence (or lack thereof) of other languages in the region, with particular reference to 
Uzbek.  
 Chapter Three will consider the political implications of ‘state’ or ‘official’ 
languages and what this could mean for the future of Kyrgyz foreign policy. Specifically, 
I will discuss Kyrgyzstan’s continual and likely future ties with Russia as its benefactor, 
perhaps working against the possibility of Central Asia one day creating a pan-Turkic 
state. I will explore how Kyrgyzstan’s choices in regards to non-titular language 
acceptance, specifically Russian, and subsequent political alignment are linked to 
Kyrgyzstan’s overall policy goals. 
According to Temple University linguist, Aneta Pavlenko, four factors guide 
long-term language retention, as is occurring in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. These four 
factors are: 1) ethnic or linguistic makeup of the population 2) linguistic and ideological 
factors that shape attitudes towards languages 3) education and employment policies and 
opportunities for the languages 4) country’s political, economic, social, cultural, and 
5 
 
religious orientation.1 Chapters One and Two will discuss the first three factors which 
guide language retention in regards to Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek. Chapter three will 
focus primarily on the fourth factor, with specific reference to the importance of 
Kyrgyzstan’s political and economic orientation.  
 Kyrgyzstan is a country located in a geopolitically strategic area, but is widely 
unknown. Within the state live an interesting mix of ethnicities, from Kyrgyz to Uzbeks 
to Russians to Germans. William Fierman, L.A. Grenoble, and other scholars have 
extensively explored Soviet language policy in Central Asia, but little research has been 
done in regards to how the current positioning of Russian in Kyrgyzstan is linked to 
Kyrgyz foreign policy. This senior thesis will, I hope, help address the questions raised 
by my year abroad about how the official status of Russian is important to long-term 
Kyrgyz foreign policy.  
Chapter One: The Russian and Soviet Presence in Kyrgyzstan in Regards to 
Language Development Until 1991 
 Kyrgyzstan is a small country located in Central Asia, surrounded by China, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This mountainous country of about five million 
residents is primarily composed of ethnic Kyrgyz, but also has large Uzbek and Russian 
minorities, in addition to other smaller German and Tajik minorities. Kyrgyzstan gained 
its independence in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union, and has since been a modestly 
democratic republic in a region filled with autocracies. 
                                                          
1 Pavlenko, Aneta. "Russian in Post-Soviet Countries." Russian Linguistics 32, no. 1 (2008): 59-80. 
JSTOR. 
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 The Kyrgyz people were largely nomadic and did not settle in Central Asia until 
the mid-seventeenth century. In 1876, Russian forces conquered the Khanate of Kokand. 
This was the beginning of Russian rule in what is now modern-day Kyrgyzstan. From 
1876 until 1921, there was minimal Russian influence on the traditional nomadic culture 
and language of Kyrgyzstan. During the early 1920s after the formation of the Soviet 
Union, the centralized government began imposing land and educational reforms, 
completely altering the previous nomadic livestock-herding way of life. Collective farms 
and a focus on a more urban lifestyle were promoted. 
 In 1921, the area that comprises modern-day Kyrgyzstan became part of the 
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Russian Soviet 
Federalist Socialist Republic. Three years later, in 1924, the central government 
delineated borders throughout Central Asia, mostly along ethnic lines, and formed the 
Kirgiz Autonomous Region. This was the first time that there were borders that formally 
delineated the territory that is now Kyrgyzstan. In 1926, the Kirgiz Autonomous Region 
became its own ASSR and, in 1936, officially became the Kirgiz Soviet Social Republic, 
or Kirgizia, a constituent republic within the USSR. Finally, in 1991 Kyrgyzstan acquired 
its current name and gained status as a sovereign nation. Since that point, Kyrgyzstan has 
had four democratically elected presidents and has maintained its independent status.2     
The Beginning of Soviet Policy: the 1920s 
 Soviet policy towards titular and non-titular languages in Central Asia shifted 
several times throughout the seventy years the region was under Soviet control. At the 
                                                          
2 “Kyrgyzstan Profile – Timeline – BBC News.” BBC News. February 24, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16185772. 
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beginning of the 1920s, literacy rates were extremely low, and though to be as minimal as 
1%. There was no standard written form of the Kyrgyz language and, as the culture was 
so nomadic, literacy was not important to the majority of society. By the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, 85%-90% of the population reported as being literate in Russian, Kyrgyz, 
or both.3 
 In the 1920s, there was a focus on creating a standardized system of writing for 
Kyrgyz, including making the vocabulary and dialects across Kyrgyzstan mutually 
understandable, and modernizing the language based on new technology and ideas. Many 
words, especially related to government and new technologies, were added to the 
language, usually with a Russian root. Kyrgyz was traditionally written in the Arabic 
alphabet, and for the first years of the Soviet Union, there were generalized attempts to 
increase literacy embracing the current Arabic alphabet. From 1926-1930, the 
government in Moscow decided that the republics should be more internationalized and 
Westernized, and subsequently shifted Kyrgyz to the Latin alphabet. This shift was not 
too difficult because of the low literacy rates. It is much easier to standardize the use of a 
new alphabet to an illiterate society than a highly literate one.   
 During this same period, the borders in the region were delineated and the 
different Central Asian languages (Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen, specifically), 
were first accepted as belonging to different territories and ethnic groups. Languages are 
often regarded as one of the most nationalistic aspects of a country as they tie directly 
into ethnic identity, and by standardizing several languages throughout the region and 
                                                          
3 Abdykadyr Orusbaev, Arto Mustajoki & Ekaterina Protassova ” Multilingualism, Russian Language and 
Education in Kyrgyzstan”, International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 11:3-4, 476-500. 
2008. 
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promoting them above Russian, the Moscow government was hoping to avoid a pan-
Turkic movement with a single common Turkic language at the foundation.4 Especially 
during the 1920s, the centralized Soviet government supported the use of titular 
languages in all official capacities. By differentiating the different languages and 
essentially creating ethnic groups based on language, instead of the previous tribal 
identity the peoples previously had where language use was localized instead of 
standardized, the government in Moscow hoped to prevent the different peoples of the 
region from coming together and banding against the centralized government under the 
idea of a shared Turkish or Islam-based heritage.  
 Improving the literacy rate during the early years of the Soviet Union was a 
difficult task that was successful only over the span of many years. In the case of the 
Soviet Union in the Kyrgyz SSR, the implemented language policy can be looked at as a 
macro political process. Essentially, the central government based in Moscow provided 
the basis for what language policy should look like and expected these orders to be 
followed out by the local governments within Kyrgyzstan5. One of the most efficient 
ways that a government can promote higher literacy rates and language policy is through 
education.  Lenin, in particular, believed that education should be in the vernacular and 
that higher education should be available in the titular language. The ethnic Russians in 
                                                          
4Fierman, William. Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience. Berlin: 
Mouteon De Gruyter, 1991.  
5 Landau, Jacob, and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele. "Language Politics in Contemporary Central Asia: 
National and Ethnic Identity and the Soviet Legacy." Choice Reviews Online 49, no. 12 (2012).   
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Central Asia were expected to learn the local language but, for a variety of reasons, they 
almost never bothered to learn more than a basic amount of Kyrgyz.6 
 One reason that the early support of Kyrgyz as the official and most important 
language of the Kyrgyz SSR was less effective than it could have been is a lack of 
funding. Schools in particular lacked books, teachers, and other materials in Kyrgyz. 
Additionally, Russian quickly became the language used in public domains, including 
government and high-paying jobs. In 1940, the alphabet shifted once more and Kyrgyz 
began to be written in the Cyrillic alphabet. This shift brought the language even closer to 
Russian and further from other Western European and Turkic language. Particularly in 
technological and scientific fields, Russian words were brought into the Kyrgyz language 
and became direct cognates.  
1930s-1990 
 Even before the shift to the Cyrillic alphabet, which formally signaled the end of 
the attempts by the centralized government to support the Kyrgyz language, the 1930s 
herded in a period of lesser cultural development and an emphasis on uniformity. Stalin’s 
government was detrimental to the limited number of Kyrgyz intellectuals, and most 
were killed by the end of the 1930s. The command from the Moscow government was 
that there should be greater uniformity; preserving the religion and cultural identity of the 
Kyrgyz ceased to be a priority and instead Soviet ideals were to be promoted over all 
others.  
                                                          
6 Kirkwood, Michael. "Glasnost' ‘the National Question’ and Soviet Language Policy." Soviet Studies 43, 
no. 1 (1991): 61-81.  
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From the mid-1930s onwards, there was a dramatic increase in asymmetrical 
bilingualism. While, up to this point, ethnic Russians living in Kyrgyzstan were 
encouraged (but not required) to learn Kyrgyz, it no longer became necessary or 
mandated in order for the ethnic Russians to succeed. This asymmetrical bilingualism 
essentially means that ethnic Russians only need to know Russian to be successful 
whereas their Central Asian counterparts were expected to be fluent in both Russian and 
their titular language. By the 1950s, only approximate 1% of ethnic Russians living in 
Kyrgyzstan were fluent in Kyrgyz while, by 1989, 54% of the ethnic Kyrgyz population 
claimed fluency in Russian as a second language.7 Until 1956, Kyrgyz was technically 
mandated in schools, but the number of hours spent on Kyrgyz language instruction were 
minimal. Only the students who truly cared to learn the language actually needed to and 
did. In order to receive and maintain and top well-paying jobs (whether a top position in a 
factory or a government position), a citizen had to have command of Russian. Many 
government documents or requests written in Kyrgyz were thrown out instead of filled 
because there was a dearth of translators and citizens who were bilingual in Russian and 
Kyrgyz. After 1938, Russian became a mandatory subject in all schools in the USSR. The 
asymmetrical bilingualism in this situation is clear; the ethnic Kyrgyz had to learn 
Russian to succeed, but the ethnic Russians had no compelling reason to learn the titular 
language. While ethnic Russians theoretically had to learn Kyrgyz in school, non-ethnic 
Kyrgyz rarely had a competent grasp on the language. The central Moscow government 
attempted to not devalue the importance of local languages, but this devaluation still 
                                                          
7 Luong, Pauline Jones. The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to 
Independence. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004.  
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occurred as Russian gradually became more necessary for success, especially in urban 
centers.8 
 The reasons why ethnic Russians did not want to learn Kyrgyz are varied. First, 
starting during Stalin’s era, the ethnic Russians already had the ability to work in better 
jobs without learning the local language. The process of nativization, or putting ethnic 
Kyrgyz into official positions over ethnic Russians, was at an end. Additionally, Kyrgyz 
was often viewed as a lesser language, and it was devaluing to have to speak it. Russian 
was also widely viewed as the language of interethnic communication and the most 
‘elite’ of all languages prevalent in the region. There was a sense among Russian 
speakers, especially with the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, that Russian was superior, 
more modern and far more urban. The ethnic Russians viewed the Kyrgyz culture as 
backwards and, as such, did not want to assimilate to the cultural differences.9  
 After this point, asymmetrical bilingualism became even more prevalent as, in the 
1950s, there was no longer any mandatory titular language study in schools. The ethnic 
Russians were holding high level positions in the government and in businesses, and the 
Russian language was necessary to be highly successful. Ethnic Kyrgyz in urban areas, 
specifically the region of Bishkek City, began to send their children to Russian-language 
or dual-language schools. The Russian schools were seen as the easy way to make sure 
that a child was successful in the future. Higher education was conducted in Russian and 
Kyrgyz, but the Kyrgyz universities often lacked the resources to be effective learning 
                                                          
8 Fierman, William. "Identity, Symbolism, and the Politics of Language in Central Asia." Europe-Asia 
Studies 61, no. 7 (2009): 1207-228.  
9 Bahry, Stephen A. "2. Language Ecology: Understanding Central Asian Multilingualism." Language 
Change in Central Asia, eds. E.S. Ahn and J. Smagulova, 11-32. Berlin: DeGruyter Mouton, 2015. 
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institutions. The schools often lacked simple things like textbooks. Almost all 
technology-based and scientific resources were in Russian. Professors did not know 
Kyrgyz well enough to teach certain courses in Kyrgyz and subsequently taught them in 
Russian, even in the Kyrgyz language universities. This is because qualified professors in 
almost every field other than the Kyrgyz language lacked the fluency in Kyrgyz needed 
to teach at a high level.10 
 The asymmetrical bilingualism and increasing importance of Russian grew from 
the 1950s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Between 1970 and 1979, the 
percentage of Central Asians who spoke Russian as a second language rose from 19.1% 
to 29.3%. At the same time, while 29.5% of ethnic Kyrgyz spoke Russian as a first or 
second language, only 3.5% of all ethnic Russians in Central Asia knew another Soviet 
language.11 In multinational states, bilingualism often naturally happens, but only when 
the titular language is secure and dominant in public. The central government must also 
be sensitive to the issues faced by those who were not bilingual. Especially after the early 
1930s, the Soviet central government was not sensitive to the titular language, though no 
attempts were made to prevent it from being used.12 
By the 1960s, especially in academia and government, Russian was almost 
exclusively used. Russian was viewed as the way to succeed internationally as well as in 
Kyrgyzstan. There was a large Russian minority (up to 21.5% of the population) by 1990, 
                                                          
10 Fierman, William. Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience. Berlin: 
Mouteon De Gruyter, 1991. 
11 Kirkwood, Michael. "Glasnost' ‘the National Question’ and Soviet Language Policy." Soviet Studies 43, 
no. 1 (1991): 61-81.  
12 Esman, Milton J. “The State and Language Policy.” International Political Science Review / Revue 
Internationale De Science Politique 13 (4) (1993): 381–96. 
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and Russian was used almost exclusively within urban areas. Government was often 
conducted in Russian due to a lack of understanding of the titular language by 
government officials. The rural Kyrgyz, or even the urban Kyrgyz, who had a less than 
perfect grasp of the Russian language or spoke it with an accent, were oftentimes looked 
down upon and seen as backwards. The centralized government still theoretically 
promoted the titular language, and Kyrgyz maintained its official status, but, especially in 
urban areas, Kyrgyz was not understood on the streets nor used in day-to-day life. At the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, there were several sizable minorities in Kyrgyzstan 
including Russians, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs. Only approximately 52% of the population 
was ethnically Kyrgyz, spread across the country. Ethnic Russians tended to live in 
Bishkek and other northern areas that predominately spoke Russian. Ethnic Uzbeks 
tended to live in southern Kyrgyzstan near and in the cities of Osh and Jalalabad.13 
Russian had become the public language of the people and Kyrgyz and other minority 
languages had become the private languages.  
By the end of the 1980s, only three of Bishkek’s sixty-nine schools were taught in 
Kyrgyz, and only 17% of higher education was conducted in a language other than 
Russian. A study of Kyrgyz literary language was conducted and, by 1980, 80% of the 
literary language used was either directly from Russian (so a Russian cognate) or from 
indirectly through Russian but with a different Western European language as the root 
word.14 Additionally, the national library only had 4% of its books in Kyrgyz and only 
                                                          
13 USA. Department of Justice. INS Research Information Center. Alert Series: Kyrgyzstan. Political 
Conditions in the Post-Soviet Area. Washington DC, 1993.  
14 Fierman, William. "Identity, Symbolism, and the Politics of Language in Central Asia." Europe-Asia 
Studies 61, no. 7 (2009): 1207-228.  
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9% of the state film and media was dubbed into or subtitled in Kyrgyz. The majority of 
literature and media were produced solely in Russian. In 1989, there were attempts to 
adopt a language law in Kyrgyzstan that would put Kyrgyz on a higher level than Russian 
in Kyrgyzstan; this caused much dissention, especially in the capital, where only 
approximately 20% of the population spoke Kyrgyz. While Kyrgyz did become the 
official language in 1989, Russian maintained its status of the language of interethnic 
communication. Due to the political turmoil of the time and the new language laws, 
between 1989 and 1992, 10% of all ethnic Russians left Kyrgyzstan, and the outflow of 
Russians continued over the next few years. Regardless of this, however, Russian 
continued to be widely used, partially because there was no budget for training new 
teachers and creating new Kyrgyz language textbooks. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan has kept 
close ties with Russian, and the international benefits of Russian make it continually 
useful in both urban and political arenas in Kyrgyzstan.   
 Altogether, during the first years of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz was actually 
supported to a large extent and, as a result, there were much higher rates of education and 
literacy among the Kyrgyz people by 1991 than before the 1920s. While Kyrgyz never 
lost its status as the national language, by the mid-1930s and, especially by the 1950s, 
Russian had taken its hold and was more valuable than Kyrgyz, specifically in urban 
areas. Russian was for public use; other languages were only for private use. 
Additionally, in education, government, and academia, Russian was used almost 
exclusively. Due to the spread of the ethnic Kyrgyz throughout the country, primarily in 
small villages in the mountains (while Uzbeks centered in the south and Russians in the 
north), Kyrgyz was one of the least promoted or accepted languages of the Soviet Union. 
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This is because there was little access between the different villages, and so the Kyrgyz 
language was more isolated than Russian or Uzbek, where the language was widely 
understood across an entire region. There was a lack of standardization and promotion of 
Kyrgyz since the speakers were spread across such a wide expanse and had few to no 
opportunities to travel to one another and use the Kyrgyz language to communicate. The 
wide variety of ethnic groups within Kyrgyzstan led to Russian also being the language 
of interethnic cooperation and the common language between the various peoples. 
Russian was considered to be one mutually understandable language for all. Finally, 
knowledge of Russian was viewed as being integral to success. 
 This being said, at the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were a few movements 
to help Kyrgyz regain its status, though they had limited success, especially in the 
northern half of the country. These movements will be discussed in the following chapter 
discussing Russian, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek in contemporary society (since the weakening 
and subsequent collapse of the USSR). Particularly due to financial constraints, Russian 
maintained its role in the government and public life as a large minority residing within 
Kyrgyzstan, and some ethnic Kyrgyz, still had no understanding of Kyrgyz, and the 
government did not have the money nor means to translate all official government 
documents from Russian into Kyrgyz. The Soviet Union did not have as stringent a 
language policy as other authoritarian regimes over time have had. Instead, at least at 
first, the titular languages were codified, and there were distinct efforts to promote 
literacy in the Kyrgyz language. Due to a wide variety of reasons, including a tightening 
of policies under Stalin and thereafter, Russian became the most important language in 
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regards to academia, government, and in public life, especially in the more literate urban 
regions of Kyrgyzstan.15  
Chapter 2: The Development of Languages in Kyrgyzstan from 1991 – present  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Republics gained their 
independence. Some republics, like Kyrgyzstan, had never had sovereign statehood. 
Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan has had to make new policy decisions about every conceivable 
topic, including language rights. This chapter will discuss the development of language 
rights and the treatment of various languages in Kyrgyzstan from 1991 to present. 
Kyrgyzstan gained its independence from the USSR on August 31, 1991, and was 
the first of the Central Asian Republics to do so. Kyrgyzstan democratically elected its 
first president, Askar Akayev, in 1990, and the foundation of a democratic multiparty 
system that currently exists was, for the most part, already in place. Kyrgyz had been an 
official language of Kyrgyzstan since 1989, when it was still officially a republic of the 
USSR, but a constitution for the new republic was not adopted until 1993, several years 
after its independence. New language laws at first gave Kyrgyz the same status as 
Russian. With the adoption of the new 1993 constitution, Kyrgyz was declared as the 
only official language of Kyrgyzstan. The adoption of a new constitution led to a major 
outmigration of Russian nationals as they felt that their language rights were being 
eliminated.16 Without these language rights, many monolingual Russian speakers felt that 
                                                          
15 Huskey, Eugene. “The Politics of Language in Kyrgyzstan.” August 1, 1995. The National Council for 
Soviet and East European Research, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC. 
16 USA. Department of Justice. INS Research Information Center. Alert Series: Kyrgyzstan. Political 
Conditions in the Post-Soviet Area. Washington DC, 1993. 
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their opportunities for success were limited and, rather than facing the new regulations, 
many Russians and other ethnic European minorities left the country.17  
From 1989 to 1999, the percentage of ethnic Russians that comprised the 
population of Kyrgyzstan dropped dramatically, partially due to the economic collapse 
and partially due to the restriction of language rights. Between 1989 and 1996 alone, 
around 600,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan left the country. By the last census of the Soviet 
Union in 1989, ethnic Russians composed 21.5% of the population and by 1996 
composed only 15.7%. In 1994, Russian was granted more rights by the government in 
order to help stem the outflow of ethnic Russians. In June of 1994, President Akayev 
decreed that Russian had official language status and could be used in the workforce in 
predominantly Russian-speaking regions of Kyrgyzstan, although Russian was not 
presidentially granted official status until 1996. Additionally, higher education began to 
be legally permitted in Russian, although Russian language higher education had 
continued to exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and formal Russian language 
universities, such as a state Slavonic university in Bishkek, began to open. There were 
also attempts to grant ethnic Russians more jobs in the Kyrgyz government in order to 
help stem the outmigration of these Russian nationals.18 Granting ethnic Russians more 
job opportunities, especially within the government, did effectively lessen the rate of out-
                                                          
17 USA. Department of Justice. INS Research Information Center. Alert Series: Kyrgyzstan. Political 
Conditions in the Post-Soviet Area. Washington DC, 1993. 
18 Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Russians in Kyrgyzstan, 2004, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38b01e.html.  
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migration.19 By 1999, Russians composed approximately 12% of the population, and as 
of 2009 the Russian minority composed approximately 9% of the population.20 
At the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic Uzbeks comprised approximately 
13.4% of the population in Kyrgyzstan.21 Unlike the Russian minority, however, there 
was no major outflow of Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan after Soviet collapse. Uzbeks now 
comprise approximately 15% of the population, making Uzbeks the largest minority 
group in Kyrgyzstan. Despite this, however, the Uzbek language has no official status 
within Kyrgyzstan and, in many cases, its role in society is limited. The anti-Uzbek 
sentiment and restrictions on the use of the language has increased in recent years, 
especially in the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken, where the majority 
of ethnic Uzbeks reside.22 Beyond the underfunded and limited number of Uzbek-
medium schools, there has been no governmental acceptance or support of the Uzbek 
language. The use of the language in public spheres was looked down on, and there were 
no movements to promote Uzbek media or education as there were for the Russian 
language. Subsequently, as Uzbek is not accepted in public spheres, it is difficult for 
ethnic Uzbeks to take part in the government and to be elected, leading to chronic 
underrepresentation. As a result of this underrepresentation, there is Uzbek resentment 
                                                          
19 The percentage of ethnic Russians elected into the government remained low, but opportunities for 
careers in general, education, and Russian-language media did expand. (Minorities at Risk 
Project, Chronology for Russians in Kyrgyzstan, 2004, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38b01e.html). 
20 Kyrgyzstan. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “Kyrgyz Republic: Ethnic Minorities 
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that the Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan have a monopoly on government institutions, 
even in regions where there is a substantial Uzbek minority.23 
Constitutional Rights 
The current constitution of Kyrgyzstan, passed by Parliament in 2010, declares 
that the state language of Kyrgyzstan is Kyrgyz while the official language is Russian. 
The state language is typically considered by the international community at large the 
language representative of a country’s ethnicity and culture and is protected and 
promoted under the law.24 An official language is typically the language used by the 
government. Overall, there is very little difference between the constitutional rights 
granted to the state language, Kyrgyz, and official language, Russian.25 Interestingly, the 
Kyrgyz constitution was actually first written in Russian and then translated into Kyrgyz 
as high-level specialists, especially in policy, have a better command of Russian. Section 
ten of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic guarantees that every ethnic group in 
Kyrgyzstan has the right to protect and use their language and to create conditions 
necessary for its study and development. Section sixteen of the document also discusses 
language rights. This section guarantees that Kyrgyzstan should respect and protect all of 
its citizens and those living within its borders without discrimination regardless of 
gender, race, language, ethnicity, handicap, age, political views, education, etc. Section 
45 clarifies that the state apparatus will provide services for the study of any state, 
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official, and other international language through all levels of standard education, 
although in practice this is not always the case. An international language is a language 
used widely between nations in trade, knowledge exchange, and for the development of 
international policy.26  Finally, section 62 relates to the requirements to be president. The 
president is required to speak the state language, Kyrgyz, but no other member of the 
government is constitutionally required to know Kyrgyz.27 
The ideals laid out in the constitution are not always followed, however.  In 
regards to Kyrgyz, the language’s importance has markedly increased since 1989. There 
has been a push in some parts of the government and country to decrease the importance 
and prevalence of Russian and other languages while increasing the presence and 
importance of Kyrgyz in all facets of society. In 2013, there were suggestions by the 
deputy of the “Republic” faction, Urmat Amanbaeva, and other pro-nationalist actors to 
amend the constitution to make Kyrgyz a requirement to work in most government 
positions including, but not limited to, ministers, deputies, secretary of state, and mayors 
and their deputies. The amendment would implement a fine for any government officials 
who conducted business in Russian. President Atambayev said he would veto any such 
amendment, and a fine has not been enacted up to this point.28  
According to the 2009 census, there were over 3.8 million people in Kyrgyzstan 
who listed Kyrgyz as their first language, with over 4.1 million people citing Kyrgyz as a 
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first or second language. There are technically more native Uzbek speakers than Russian 
speakers, but Russian is far more widely known as a second language. Almost 2.6 million 
residents of Kyrgyzstan reported speaking Russian as a first or second language, while 
only a little over 870,000 residents spoke Uzbek as a first or second language. Russian is 
viewed as being far more useful internationally, and is often the second language of both 
ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks.29  
In 2015, the National Commission of Government Language, currently led by 
Egemberdy Ermatov, made statements about amending the constitution so as to enforce 
Kyrgyz language rights. This commission was founded in January 1998 and its primary 
purpose is to promote the development of the state language.30 Ermatov declared that 
many government officials do not purposefully use Russian instead of Kyrgyz in official 
capacities, such as during meetings, but that is what often occurs because of Russian’s 
continued pervasive presence in Kyrgyz society. As long as Russian is allowed by the 
constitution, Ermatov continues, there will be little change in the widespread usage of 
Russian instead of Kyrgyz at a governmental level.31 Further attempts in recent years to 
ensure all official documents are in Kyrgyz and to promote only Kyrgyz media have been 
widely ineffective due to lack of follow-through, lack of a desire by the majority of 
Kyrgyz citizens and government members to curtail Russian, and a lack of funding to 
translate previously written documents. Demand for Russian-language schools is greater 
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than the number of schools functioning in Russian as more scientific and academic 
literature is written in Russian than Kyrgyz. Parents recognize that an education in 
Russian will lead to more opportunities of advancement for their children.32 Furthermore, 
many ethnic Kyrgyz government officials, especially within Bishkek, do not have 
complete control of Kyrgyz and therefore prefer conducting business in Russian, 
imposing more limits on the attempts to promote Kyrgyz.33 Additionally, some policy 
makers fear that further curtailing Russian would lead to an increased ‘brain-drain’ where 
the highly educated members of society (oftentimes educated in Russian), would leave 
the country in order to find better careers and lives for themselves and their families.34 
Especially during the political upheaval of 2010, certain groups of Kyrgyz 
nationalists, including the Ata-Metken (or “Fatherland”) party, ran on a platform 
promoting Kyrgyz language to the detriment of Russian. Azimjan Ibraimov, the head of 
the National Commission for the State Language in 2010, was one such promoter of the 
Kyrgyz language. He proposed implementing a policy that all members of the 
government down to the lowliest clerk must speak Kyrgyz. This test would further tip the 
already unequal balance of representatives in the government away from non-Kyrgyz 
ethnic groups including, but not limited to, Russians, Uzbeks, Uighurs and Tatars. 
Ibraimov and other nationalists argue that Kyrgyz should be the only language of 
Kyrgyzstan, primarily due to their strong nationalistic sentiments. This limiting policy, 
however, would cause ethnic minorities to have fewer reasons to stay in Kyrgyzstan and 
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would also limit the ability of ethnic Kyrgyz to go to Russia or Kazakhstan to seek 
employment.35   
Despite the continued presence of Russian, especially in Bishkek, very few ethnic 
Russians hold jobs in government positions. Russian is especially pervasive in certain 
fields, however, and plays an invaluable role in many aspects of Kyrgyz society. First, 
Russian is the language of science and technology in Kyrgyzstan. Many of the scientific 
and technological words in Kyrgyz come directly from the Russian root. Russian also 
allows the Kyrgyz to compete internationally in science and technology, as well as do 
research and advanced study on most scientific and technological topics. There is a dearth 
of Kyrgyz-language materials (such as textbooks) and teachers who can teach the 
advanced material in Kyrgyz.  
Russian literature is also far more diverse and prevalent in Kyrgyzstan than 
Kyrgyz literature, and will continue to have a huge influence on the youth of the 
country.36 Furthermore, the Russian language allows for more international opportunities. 
Not only is it the language of interethnic communication, but it provides for opportunities 
for Kyrgyz to study at top universities both in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Russian also 
allows for migrant workers to find jobs in the wealthier Russia so as to send remittances 
back to Kyrgyzstan.37 In addition, the Russian language is prevalent in pop culture and 
media. Many major news outlets, including newspapers, radio shows, and TV channels 
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are in Russian. Finally, because of Kyrgyzstan’s economic ties with Russia, commerce is 
also primarily conducted in Russian. Kyrgyz is slowly beginning to appear in 
administration, documentation, and official meetings, but Russian retains importance in 
pop media, higher education, science, and technology.38 Due to Kyrgyzstan’s economic, 
military, and social reliance on Russia, it seems likely that Russian will retain its status as 
an official language and will have staying power in the foreseeable future, even against 
the rise of Kyrgyz and other international languages such as English.39 
Even while Russian has official status and is widely accepted, Uzbek has not had 
the same prosperity, partly due to the ethnic tensions that exist between ethnic Kyrgyz 
and ethnic Uzbeks. In spring 2010, there was political unrest and a revolution in the 
northern provinces of Kyrgyzstan, and President Bakieyev was formally ousted from 
power on April 7. Before the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic tension and unrest 
had already existed in the more unstable southern half of Kyrgyzstan (the provinces of 
Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken). The Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan primarily view Kyrgyzstan as 
their home and do not seem to express a real desire to unite the southern provinces with 
Uzbekistan or to migrate back to Uzbekistan.40 The ethnic Kyrgyz in the region, however, 
distrust the Uzbeks and feel that they are attempting to wrest the fertile land in the 
Fergana Valley from Kyrgyz control.41 Ethnic Uzbeks have been consistently discontent 
with their lack of representation in governing bodies, even on a local level. Under the 
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first president of Kyrgyzstan, President Akayev (1991-2000), and his successor President 
Bakieyev (2000-2010), the ethnic Uzbeks felt that their requests for better representation 
were not listened to nor respected.42 Immediately following the spring revolution, Pro-
Bakieyev actors attempted to resist the new interim government led by ethnic Kyrgyz 
Roza Otunbayeva. The interim government was supported by the ethnic Uzbeks, 
however, who felt that the Bakieyev government was not listening to their concerns. 
In June 2010, what began as a gang conflict sparked a broader ethnic conflict in 
the traditionally unstable South, which led to estimates of more than 200 dead and 40,000 
ethnic Uzbek attempting to flee the country. Uzbek language rights had been limited 
before the revolution, and Uzbek language schools were slowly closing. After the region 
settled, the rate of Uzbek-language school closures began to increase and to quicken, 
likely due to increased ethnic tensions and a greater repression of the Uzbek minority in 
Kyrgyzstan.43 
Languages and Schools  
 Uzbek and other non-official and non-state languages have faced dramatic 
limitations in recent years, despite the Constitution’s guarantee of equal rights for all 
languages. The easiest way to see the limits on Uzbek is through the school system. Most 
of the remaining Uzbek-language schools are located in the three southern provinces of 
Kyrgyzstan: Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Batken. In these regions, 36.5% of the population is 
ethnically Uzbek. While Uzbek-language schools were starved of funding by the national 
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government and many were closing before 2010, the ethnic conflict in Osh in that year 
accelerated school closures and increased discrimination, especially with regards to 
language rights and the jobs available to monolingual Uzbek-speakers.44Although there 
has been no outbreak of violence since 2010, tensions after the uprising are higher 
between the two ethnic groups.45 
In 2013, there were 2,205 schools in Kyrgyzstan. Of those, Kyrgyz was the sole 
language of instruction at 1,424, Russian at 203, Uzbek at 91, and Tajik at three. 
Additionally, 484 schools were dual-language, almost all of which were Kyrgyz-
Russian.46 Even in 2003, there were 141 Uzbek-language schools. Additionally, the state 
test required in order to study at a university level used to be offered in any language for 
which there was demand. Beginning in 2014, however, this mandatory test is only offered 
in Russian and Kyrgyz. Of the two universities in Kyrgyzstan which offered programs 
taught in Uzbek, one was closed in 2010 and one was converted to a Russian-Kyrgyz 
language university.47 
Uzbek-language schools are facing many difficulties which contribute to their 
continued closures. While the Kyrgyz government is promoting the idea that Uzbek 
parents are requesting the change, that is only part of the story.48 Without any higher-
level educational opportunities for Uzbek, many Uzbek parents feel that their children 
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must learn Russian or Kyrgyz in order to succeed. Many Uzbek families choose to send 
their children to Russian-language schools because there are more career and educational 
opportunities in Russia than in Kyrgyzstan. The Russian government provides 
approximately 450 full scholarships for university-level study for citizens of Kyrgyzstan 
in Russia. Because of the access to better resources, including Russia-funded textbooks, 
as well as scientific and academic literature as a whole, Russian better allows for careers 
in medicine, law, and finance.49 In addition, there is a shortage of teachers who are 
qualified to teach Uzbek, especially due to a lack of experience. That problem will only 
be exacerbated now that there are no Uzbek-language universities at which future 
teachers can learn how to teach complex material in Uzbek. Funding for teachers is 
limited in Kyrgyzstan, and especially so for Uzbek-language schools, so few to no 
Uzbeks wish to move to Kyrgyzstan to become a teacher. Likewise, ethnic Uzbeks who 
have a higher education in Uzbek have few opportunities for job advancement, so they do 
not wish to continue their education in Uzbekistan. Many parents feel that teaching their 
children practical skills is more important and helpful than having a higher education that 
does not guarantee a high-skilled and well-paying job.50 
There is also a lack of resources at the primary-school level, making the Uzbek-
language schools that are still functioning both understaffed and undersupplied. There is 
little budget for these schools, meaning that there are not enough textbooks and the 
textbooks that do exist are outdated. Uzbek in Uzbekistan is primarily taught using the 
Latin alphabet, but Uzbek language teachers in Kyrgyzstan have not made the switch to 
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the Latin alphabet, partially because both Kyrgyz and Russian use the Cyrillic script. This 
means that the Uzbek-language schools cannot simply order new or more textbooks from 
Uzbekistan. Instead, the textbooks would have to be provided through public or private 
means in Kyrgyzstan, which does not occur.51 
Uzbek and other minority languages are not protected to the extent promised in 
the Kyrgyz constitution. While dual-language schools exist for Uzbek and Tajik, they are 
limited and lacking in funding. Additionally, while it is possible for ethnic Uzbeks to 
survive without knowing Russian or Kyrgyz, the use of minority languages is primarily 
limited to home life and to low-level service-oriented careers. Ethnic Uzbeks struggle to 
find well-paying jobs and are underrepresented in the elite workforce, especially on a 
governmental level. In addition to facing broader anti-Uzbek sentiment, the Uzbek 
language alone does not provide the skills and opportunities needed to be highly 
successful in society. These challenges also exist for other ethnic groups. Even the ethnic 
Russians are underrepresented in the government, despite the fact that many government 
meetings and operations are carried out in Russian. The ethnic tensions that exist between 
the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks hint at the idea that Uzbek will never have majority-minority 
language rights in Kyrgyzstan, despite the size of the Uzbek minority. 
At the same time, while the ethnic Russian population is dwindling (especially in 
terms of percentage as the birth rate of other ethnicities is higher than that of ethnic 
Russians), it seems unlikely that Russian will lose its status as an official language of 
Kyrgyzstan anytime in the near future. Despite the lack of representation of ethnic 
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Russians in the government, Russian has played and continues to play an important role 
in Kyrgyzstan. Russian is still the language of interethnic communication, but also is the 
language of business, science, and technology, while Kyrgyz does play an increasingly 
important role as a state language. Kyrgyz will remain the state language and it seems 
likely that its importance will grow as Kyrgyz nationalism expands, but Russian seems to 
have substantial staying power in the region.  
In the upcoming chapter, I will discuss how Russian and Uzbek are considered 
and utilized in Kyrgyzstan in regards to Kyrgyz foreign policy. Domestically, the 
promotion of Kyrgyz by the government has been important rhetoric, but the importance 
of Russian on a broader scale, and why Uzbek is not so important, will be evaluated. The 
foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan will also be considered and used to investigate the 
hypothesis that the influence and pervasiveness of Russian in Kyrgyzstan will not be 
weakened in the upcoming years due to the importance of Russia as a bilateral partner 
both politically, economically, and socially. 
Chapter 3: Kyrgyz Foreign Policy and its Relation to Language Rights 
 The past two chapters have considered Pavlenko’s first three factors that guide 
language retention in specific regards to Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek. The three factors 
discussed are the ethnic or linguistic makeup of the population, the linguistic and 
ideological factors of a country, and the educational and employment policies and 
opportunities in the country. This chapter will investigate in depth the fourth factor, or 
how the political, economic, social, cultural and religious orientation of Kyrgyzstan will 
affect Kyrgyz language policies. There will be specific emphasis on the political and 
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economic factors that influence Kyrgyz language policy and subsequently are potentially 
representative of broader Kyrgyz foreign policy as a whole.52  
Since Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991, the government has, until recently, 
primarily promoted a policy of multi-vector foreign policy. Essentially this means that 
Kyrgyzstan has attempted to benefit from a wide variety of world actors simultaneously 
while not alienating any one actor.53 Kyrgyzstan has had to simultaneously balance its 
own interests with the interests of foreign states. Due to the weak economy and lack of 
infrastructure, Kyrgyzstan is additionally largely reliant on outside aid. Kyrgyzstan has 
had to work with a wide range of countries, especially Russia, China, the U.S., and 
neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in order to maintain its status as 
an independent state.54  
 First, the factors which relate to the structure of developing a foreign policy 
should be considered. In order to create an effective foreign policy, Kyrgyzstan must 
make decisions with the goal of improving its domestic prosperity. Both internal and 
external factors affect how and why foreign policy is implemented and determine the 
bilateral and multilateral foreign relations of a state. Internal factors that can affect 
foreign policy include political instability, weak state institutions, power struggles 
between political groups, and the economic condition of a state and its neighbors. In 
Kyrgyzstan, there has been some political instability, especially due to the revolutions in 
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both 2005 and 2010. Opposition groups and political parties can use foreign policy, as 
well as language policy, as a platform.55 An example of this is the rise of Kalys, a 
nationalist movement which promotes the Kyrgyz ethnic group and, subsequently, the 
Kyrgyz language. Other non-democratic actors, such as ‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir), 
are pro-Russian and support the actions of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, specifically 
in the context of Ukraine. Anti-Western groups, like Russian World, are often widespread 
throughout Central Asia and within Kyrgyzstan, and have seen an increase in numbers 
since Western criticism of Putin’s actions in Crimea began. While the Kyrgyz 
administration has criticized these extremist groups, the government has not been able to 
effectively handle or dismiss the groups. The civil groups pose little nation-wide threat to 
stability, but these actors can affect foreign policy decisions by affecting the political 
strength of the president and other high-level government officials.56 
 Domestically, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy structure is similar to that of Russia’s. 
The structure was developed in 1992, with the president the primary actor in foreign 
affairs. There is also a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an International Department of the 
Presidential Administration, both of which augment the president’s powers in foreign 
policy-making. The president has ultimate say in foreign policy decisions, and both the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Department of the Presidential 
Administration are answerable to the president. Kyrgyz foreign policy is often used to 
strengthen domestic affairs. Foreign policy can consolidate the president’s power, 
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especially if the foreign policy action improves the economy in some manner. Due to the 
weak Kyrgyz economy, actions such as allowing Russian airbases in Kyrgyzstan in return 
for debt forgiveness can strengthen the president’s grasp on power and limit the power of 
opposition groups. The government cannot actively support the more extremist groups 
that exist, as those can negatively affect Kyrgyz multi-vector foreign policy as a whole, 
but actions that lean slightly pro-Russian or pro-West and improve domestic stability help 
to lessen the impact and growth of the more extreme groups, whether they are pro-
Russian or believe that Kyrgyzstan should solely be for the Kyrgyz.57   
 External factors also can affect the development of foreign policy. Regional 
stability or, in this case, the stability of neighboring nations such as Uzbekistan, the 
Uighur Xinjiang region of China, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, is one such factor. 
International order as a whole is another determining factor. While Russia has been and is 
arguably the most important actor in regards to Kyrgyz foreign policy, other countries, 
including the United States from 9/11/01 until the U.S. airbase at the Manas Transit 
Center in Bishkek closed in July 2014, have also had an impact on regional affairs. The 
continued presence of the Russian language facilitates contact and communication 
between Kyrgyz and Russian governments, whereas other languages such as Chinese and 
English are not as prevalent or widely spoken. Only approximately 1% of the population 
speaks English fluently, and only 5.2% of the population identifies their primary 
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language as something other than Kyrgyz, Russian, or Uzbek.5859 China, Russia, and the 
U.S. are regarded as the three largest and most influential actors in Central Asia, and 
Kyrgyzstan’s reliance and continued use of Russian could show one way in which 
Kyrgyzstan, intentionally or not, feels itself closest to Russia of the three powerhouse 
countries in the region. The use of the Russian language could be a tool by which 
Kyrgyzstan attempts to not be overwhelmed by new Chinese interests and resources, 
especially economically.60 
Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan has been striving to be an active part of many 
international organizations so as to diversify Kyrgyz bilateral and multilateral 
relationships.  There are domestic arguments about whether this multi-vector foreign 
policy is more effective in promoting Kyrgyzstan’s prosperity than closer bilateral 
relationships with a few strong partners. While the country has recently been shifting its 
focus towards stronger bilateral relationships with a few actors, especially Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan has not ended its multilateral relations, nor its engagement with international 
organizations. In 1993, Kyrgyzstan was the first former Soviet Republic in Central Asia 
to create its own currency: the Kyrgyz som. Shortly thereafter, it joined the World Bank 
where the country has retained its member status. Other key programs Kyrgyzstan still 
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participates in include the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) Partnership for 
Peace program as well as the United Nations (UN).61  
 In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was deeply impoverished and looked to Russia for 
assistance during the economic and political turmoil. Yeltsin’s Russia, however, was 
more concerned with domestic issues than with the former Soviet republics in Central 
Asia. While multilateral organizations between Central Asian Republics and Russia were 
created, the bilateral relationship between Russia and Kyrgyzstan was weak and there 
was minimal concern for Kyrgyzstan on the Russian side. Due to the increase in Western 
organizations in Central Asia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were both created, and Kyrgyzstan was 
offered membership to these Moscow-based organizations in 1998.  Security-wise, 
politically, and economically, these organizations were more beneficial to Kyrgyzstan 
than to Russia, and a large reason that they were created was to off-balance rising U.S. 
interests in the region, especially in regards to the NATO Partnership for Peace 
Program.62 
Kyrgyz-Russian Bilateral Relations  
 By 1999, Russia was showing deeper interest in Kyrgyzstan due to a desire for 
regional stability, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the increase of U.S. presence in 
its “near-abroad”, or what Russia views as its sphere of influence. In both 1999 and 2000, 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) moved into the southern regions of 
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Kyrgyzstan, and, despite calls for aid, the Russians did not send assistance, worrying both 
the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks as the IMU had ties to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. While Russia 
did not get involved with the IMU situation, Russia began to recognize the Central Asian 
security concerns that influence Russia, and the Moscow government has slowly become 
more involved in the region due to these security risks. Some of the shared concerns 
include an increase in narcotics and drugs that make their way to Russia, as well as the 
fear the Islamic extremism could spread to Muslim portions of the Russian population, 
especially in Chechnya.63  
 In the early 2000s, Russia promoted its regional organizations more heavily than 
during the 1990s, especially the CSTO. The CSTO allowed for joint military operations 
along borders and elsewhere. Due to Russia’s military superiority, the CSTO is a way in 
which Russia’s military presence can be felt throughout Central Asia. Additionally, the 
CSTO allowed Russian weapons to permeate the region, the military elite of the Central 
Asian states to be trained at Russian military academies, and allowed Russian access to 
Central Asian military bases.  
Even while Russia was attempting to promote its regional organizations, after the 
terror attacks on 9/11/01 in the United States, the U.S. very quickly made agreements to 
use airbases in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The U.S. airbase stayed open and 
functional until 2014. The sudden U.S. military presence led to Russian fears of U.S. 
expansion and further attempts to continue its control and influence in the region. This 
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further increased the presence of Russia in Central Asia as Russia did not want to lose 
influence over their near-abroad to the West.64 
 In 2003, as Kyrgyzstan drew closer to NATO and the U.S. as the war on terrorism 
continued, Russia’s President Putin visited Kyrgyzstan and announced that a new military 
base, Kant, would open just twenty kilometers from the U.S. base near Bishkek. Despite 
some discontent among Kyrgyz elite, former President Akayev nevertheless allowed the 
base to be opened, citing reasons of needing a strong regional ally (Russia). Additionally, 
Russia agreed to extend Kyrgyzstan’s debt repayment another twenty years in return for 
the opening of the Kant base. As of 2003, Presidents Putin and Akayev signed a fifteen-
year lease for the Kant Air Base.65 Since that point, the lease for the Kant Air Base has 
been extended until at least 2032, displaying that the Russian military presence in 
Kyrgyzstan will not be weakening anytime in the near future.66 With the continued 
presence of Russian airbases, it is clear that Kyrgyzstan will continue to rely on Russia 
militarily, and these close military and overall bilateral ties will positively affect the 
continued status of Russian as an official language of Kyrgyzstan.  
 The U.S. airbase caused much tension within the domestic leadership of 
Kyrgyzstan but also between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. By 2009, Russia was demanding 
the closure of the U.S. airbase, and Kyrgyz President Bakieyev agreed. Instead of 
following through with this agreement, however, Kyrgyzstan double-crossed Russia and 
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allowed U.S. presence to remain until 2014 in return for increases in rent payment. There 
has been some speculation that Bakieyev’s ousting in the following year was due to 
Russian intervention as a result of Kyrgyzstan reneging on its agreement to close the U.S. 
airbase in 2009. In 2014, after continued pressure from Russia and a lessening of interest 
in the region by the U.S., the airbase was shut down.67 
In 2011, current President Atambayev was democratically elected, and since that 
point, there has been a visible shift towards Russia in regards to foreign policy making 
and decisions. In 2014, the U.S. airbase at Manas Transit Center formally closed and U.S. 
troops left the area. The Russian airbases have remained open, however. After many 
years of discussion, Kyrgyzstan finally joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
whose membership is now comprised of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. It is as of yet relatively unclear what economic benefits Kyrgyzstan will 
receive from joining the EEU, but by joining this union, Kyrgyzstan demonstrated its 
shift towards the Russian-speaking world and declared its intent to rely primarily on 
Russia and its allies. With a deepening relationship with Russian economically and 
politically, it seems likely that the Russian language will continue to exist and be 
important in Kyrgyz society. 
Kyrgyzstan is small and lacking in resources (excluding hydropower). The 
populace is reliant on a variety of methods to ensure its economic survival. Virtually 
every Kyrgyz family has at least one family member working abroad to send remittances 
back to Kyrgyzstan. The majority of these migrant workers are in Russia. It is estimated 
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that more than 33% of the annual GDP of Kyrgyzstan comes from remittances. The 
recent multi-year recession facing Russia is problematic for Kyrgyzstan. The exchange 
rate from the Russian ruble to the Kyrgyz som has become dramatically smaller as the 
value of the ruble dropped. Additionally, the citizens who took out loans against the U.S. 
dollar or Euro now are unable to repay them. The Kyrgyz government fears that the 
approximately one million migrant workers currently living and working in Russia will 
return to Kyrgyzstan, where they will likewise be unable to find work to support their 
families, creating greater macroeconomic instability. Kyrgyz citizens are able to work in 
Russia effectively, however, due to the fact that they are able to speak in Russian. The 
fact that the Kyrgyz government does not want the entire population of ethnic Kyrgyz at 
home due to the small size of the economy is another reason why Russian will likely 
remain an official language; remittances form an integral part of the Kyrgyz economy 
and without the Russian language, a large portion of the GDP would be non-existent.68 
In addition, another large fraction of the Kyrgyz GDP is dependent on an import-
driven economy. Kyrgyzstan gains profits from reselling cheap Chinese goods to Russia 
and Kazakhstan. The new EEU, however, means that there will be tariffs in place on 
Chinese goods and, as of yet, it is unclear how much of a negative effect this will have on 
the Kyrgyz economy. The fact that the Kyrgyz government still agreed to join the EEU 
despite a potential economic downturn displays its desire to remain in the Russian sphere 
of influence instead of trying to separate itself and find other regional partners. 
Kyrgyzstan’s continued desire to rely primarily on Russia in terms of economic aid and 
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support, as well as recent Kyrgyz actions to bind the state closer to Russia politically and 
socially, emphasizes the idea that the Russian language has substantial staying power in 
Kyrgyzstan. Finally, Kyrgyzstan has become increasingly dependent on Russian energy, 
including Gazprom and Rosneft, as Uzbekistan becomes a less reliable source of energy, 
which is another key factor relating to economic and political ties and, subsequently, 
language retention.69 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek Bilateral Relations 
This latter point is part of a larger regional issue; Kyrgyzstan has been shifting 
towards Russia in its foreign policy partially due to the unstable relations between the 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek border lies in the fertile Fergana 
Valley, which is often regarded as the breadbasket of Central Asia. There have been 
border issues existing since 1999. At that point, President Karimov of Uzbekistan 
declared that the border should be more closely monitored, and took unilateral action to 
control the border. Karimov claimed that the Kyrgyz near the border were coming over to 
the richer Uzbekistan to buy their bread and other goods, and that it was not his country’s 
job to provide charity. Additionally, this move cemented Uzbekistan’s role as a regional 
powerhouse and entrenched Karimov’s political authority.  
The actual results of stricter border control have led to the ethnic Uzbeks in 
southern Kyrgyzstan feeling more isolated. Many ethnic Uzbeks have family across the 
border in Uzbekistan, but the border control is so strict that many cannot return to visit 
their families for events such as weddings or funerals. Since the 2010 ethnic conflict near 
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the southern Kyrgyz border, tensions have risen even further, creating a greater mistrust 
of the ethnic Uzbek residing within Kyrgyzstan and a greater mistrust of Uzbek 
intentions towards the smaller, more impoverished Kyrgyzstan as a whole.70 
At the time of the 2010 ethnic conflict, during which several hundred ethnic 
Uzbeks were killed, Uzbek troops on the southern border of Kyrgyzstan were prepared to 
enter Kyrgyzstan to protect the Uzbek ethnic minority residing within Kyrgyzstan. 
Russia, however, has an airbase in the region, and was strongly opposed to Uzbek entry 
into Kyrgyzstan. The Russian government viewed this as a security threat, and the 
possibility of Russian reprisal likely prevented Uzbek military involvement in 
Kyrgyzstan.71  
After Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has the second strongest and best-equipped military 
in Central Asia. With a significantly larger population than Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek army 
has approximately 40,000 members, whereas the Kyrgyz army has approximately 8,500. 
Uzbekistan forces focus more on the National Security Service, or maintaining domestic 
peace, than on international affairs. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan fears Uzbek hegemonic 
intentions and increasingly is relying on Russia for protection and military support. No 
military force in the region can compare to Russian military strengths. Although Russian 
presence is likely to increase in the two weaker countries of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan), Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan will all likely work on 
military reforms in the upcoming years. The upcoming reforms do not signal a complete 
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decrease in Russian influence in the region, however; while Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Kazakhstan do not wish to rely on Russian military assistance, the Russian military 
presence will likely increase in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
have limited military capabilities compared to their neighboring countries, and closer ties 
with Russia will help ensure their security against the other states of Central Asia.72 
Kyrgyzstan will increasingly depend on Russian protection from their larger more 
powerful neighbor, Uzbekistan, further bolstering the Kyrgyz reliance on close bilateral 
Kyrgyz-Russian relations to maintain sovereignty and security. This reliance will further 
increase the importance of the Russian language as Kyrgyz-Russian bilateral 
relationships strengthen and Kyrgyzstan continues to shift away from Uzbek influence.  
Uzbekistan as a whole has a foreign policy of constantly rebalancing and 
realigning so as to avoid Russian pressures. President Karimov prefers working along 
bilateral lines with other nations without Russian involvement. The Uzbek government is 
particularly worried about the Russian airbase in Osh, the largest city in southern 
Kyrgyzstan. While the Uzbek military is substantially stronger and better-equipped than 
the Kyrgyz military, Uzbekistan recognizes that it does not have the military strength to 
balance against Russia. The border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is mined, and 
there are still restrictions on cross-border trade and movement in general, as well as 
restricted water and energy flows. The water from Kyrgyzstan flows into Uzbekistan. 
Without enough water, the Uzbek cotton crop suffers. As a result, Uzbekistan has 
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regularly cut off the gas and energy flow into Kyrgyzstan as a measure to ensure that 
Kyrgyzstan does not restrict water flow.73  
In recent years there has been no relaxing of border tensions, despite meetings of 
high-level government officials from both the Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides since 2014. 
Uzbekistan continued to deny gas to Kyrgyzstan as of winter 2015, leading Kyrgyzstan to 
scramble to find alternate energy sources from Russia and Kazakhstan. President 
Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan said that Uzbekistan was trying to destroy Kyrgyz self-
sufficiency in order to destabilize the country. President Atambayev has threatened to 
skip the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit forthcoming in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, in June 2016 as a result of continued border tensions and overall lack of a 
positive bilateral relationship between the two nations. In the past year, there has been a 
flare-up of tensions, with Uzbek military forces seen near the southern Kyrgyz border. As 
part of the CSTO, Moscow has been notified but, so far, no actions have been taken by 
the Uzbek military or by Moscow. Unless tensions worsen, it is unlikely that Russia and 
other CSTO members will get directly involved. At the same time, however, it is unlikely 
that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will develop stronger bilateral relations anytime in the 
near future. While Uzbekistan is stronger military and economically, Kyrgyzstan uses its 
stronger relationship with Russia to balance any potential Uzbek aggression.74 It is clear 
that there are few strong economic, social, political, or cultural ties between Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. Unlike with Russia, there seems to be little place for the Uzbek language 
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to take on an official role in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the large Uzbek minority, there are few 
positive aspects of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek bilateral relationship and, especially due to the lack 
of political and economic ties between the nations, it seems unlikely that Uzbek will gain 
official status in Kyrgyzstan.  
Politically, since President Atambayev came to power, it has been clear that while 
Kyrgyz foreign policy still has multi-vector aspects, it has been shifting slightly away 
from multi-vector foreign policy and towards a more Russian-centric policy. Kyrgyzstan 
is still a part of many multilateral organizations and has ties to the West, but it is evident 
through Kyrgyzstan’s reliance on the CSTO and recent ascension to the EEU that 
Kyrgyzstan is increasingly relying on Russia both in terms of security and economic aid. 
Kyrgyzstan wishes to be considered the bridge to Asia and Europe and is unlikely to cut 
ties with neighboring amicable countries or end its involvement with the EU, NATO, or 
SCO, but it is slowly seeming more and more that Kyrgyzstan’s priority in regards to 
foreign policy is Russia.75 Even before Kyrgyzstan was an independent state, Russian 
played an influential role in Kyrgyz society. Since its independence, Kyrgyzstan has 
increasingly made choices which bind the country to Russia and, as a result, the Russian 
language. Overall, it is unlikely that Russian will lose its status as an official language 
because of the pervasive influence of Russia on the Kyrgyz culture as well as 
Kyrgyzstan’s increasing reliance on Russia for security and economic stability. 
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 In a direct comparison, Russian and Uzbek language rights correlate to all four of 
Pavlenko’s ideas on the reasons behind language retention and staying power in 
Kyrgyzstan. In each case, Russia is closer to Kyrgyzstan and, as such, Russian plays a far 
more important role in Kyrgyz society. In regards to the ethnic and linguistic makeup of 
the population, Russian is more widely spoken, even if only as a second language, than 
Uzbek, despite the fact that the Uzbek minority is larger than the Russian minority. 
Uzbek, however, is viewed as being not very useful as it cannot be considered an 
international language, unlike Russian. Additionally, Uzbek is not viewed as a language 
necessary to learn in order to succeed in Kyrgyzstan or in Russia. There were and are also 
far more educational and work opportunities for those who speak Russian in Kyrgyzstan 
than those who speak Uzbek. There are opportunities for Russian-speakers to study in 
Russia as well as the ability to work abroad, as a large percentage of the population does. 
 The fourth point also seems to hold true when investigating language policies and 
usages in Kyrgyzstan, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy actions and recent shift 
towards Russia. Culturally, due to the former influence of the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz 
people feel relatively close to the Russian culture; Bishkek in particular is viewed as a 
Russified city by Russians, Kyrgyz, and Westerners alike. The prevalence of the Russian 
language and culture are far more visible within the city where more ethnic Russians live 
and Russian economic support is more pronounced.76 Before the creation of the Soviet 
Union in 1922, Kyrgyzstan was not a formal state, and so it was easier for the Soviet 
Union to influence the culture of the country. 
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 Additionally, Russia and Kyrgyzstan have had a long history of trade, and 
therefore Kyrgyzstan is used to relying on Russia as an economic partner. For the most 
part, Kyrgyzstan exports raw cotton, raw tobacco, copper, and other unfinished goods to 
Russia while Russia primarily exports refined petroleum to Kyrgyzstan.77 Russia is 
viewed as a safe economic partner, and much of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP relies on both trade 
with and remittances from Russia. Finally, politically, Kyrgyzstan is closely allied to the 
Russian government. Kyrgyzstan fears Uzbek hegemony and therefore ties itself closer to 
Russia in order to protect its sovereignty and interests.78  
 Despite the large Uzbek minority, however, it seems highly unlikely that Uzbek 
will ever gain official status in Kyrgyzstan despite the discontent of the ethnic Uzbeks 
residing in Kyrgyzstan. These two countries do not share a history, excluding their shared 
experience with Soviet rule and, as such, there is little to no room for advancement with 
the Uzbek language. Kyrgyzstan does not align itself societally or economically with 
Uzbekistan. Instead, tensions between the two countries have increased, especially in 
regards to the border in southern Kyrgyzstan. None of the prerequisites as listed by 
Pavlenko are met, and therefore Uzbek will always be a secondary language of 
Kyrgyzstan, and not a primary or official one.  
 The status of Russian as one of Kyrgyzstan’s official languages can be considered 
a part of broader Kyrgyz foreign policy goals. As a member of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Russian is integral to Kyrgyzstan’s continued success and integration 
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in the organization.79  At the same time, the law on the state language of Kyrgyzstan, 
originally written in 2004, was revised in 2015 to say that while the state language 
(Kyrgyz) should be used for domestic affairs, in necessary circumstances, Russian can be 
used.80 Domestically, the government is technically promoting Kyrgyz, but the law does 
clearly allow for the usage of Russian, and does not clarify the meaning of ‘necessary’. 
As such, while a law exists on language usage, it does not provide many real restrictions 
on the use of Russian. The continued implicit support of Russian can also display, to an 
extent, how Kyrgyz foreign policy will be developed in the upcoming years. Kyrgyzstan 
is continuously improving its bilateral relationship with Russia and indeed depends on 
Russia for many of its political and economic needs, although it maintains its presence in 
broader multilateral organizations. Russia provides a safety net needed to allow for the 
sustainability and sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan and, as a result, the Russian language allows 
for the broader mobilization and success of its elite politicians who create and conduct 
foreign policy as well as the citizens who are merely educated at Russian institutions or 
who require Russian for job stability and success in high-level careers. 
Conclusion  
 Overall, Kyrgyzstan has had a short history of statehood due to its traditional 
nomadic history. Starting in the 1860s, Tsarist Russia and all of its successor 
governments have played an important role in developing Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan. 
Due to its small size, lack of natural resources, limited economic development, 
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traditionally nomadic culture, and fears of Chinese and Uzbek aggression, Kyrgyzstan 
has perhaps felt the influence of the Russian language and peoples more than any other 
nation in Central Asia, excluding Tajikistan. 
 While Kyrgyz is a Turkic language that has existed for centuries, it had no written 
form or standardization until the arrival of the Soviets. While at first the centralized 
Soviet government allowed for the study of Kyrgyz, soon it changed its policies and 
Russian became mandatory. The demographic make-up of the country also shifted as the 
Moscow government delineated borders in Central Asia and relocated ethnic Russians 
into the region. Border demarcations in southern Kyrgyzstan were drawn in such a 
manner that there is a large Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan. A smaller, yet still 
substantial, Russian minority also still resides in modern-day Kyrgyzstan, though 
primarily in the northern part of the country. 
 Despite the larger Uzbek minority, Russian has official language status and is in 
fact regularly used as the official language in government affairs. Additionally, Russian 
has equal or higher status than Kyrgyz when it comes to pop culture, higher education 
and, occasionally, business. This thesis was meant to address why Russian is still so 
pervasive in Kyrgyz society. In order to do so, I looked at recent Kyrgyz foreign policy 
and how language policy relates to political and economic ties between countries. These 
political and economic ties directly relate to language usage and presence and explain not 
only why Russian is so pervasive, but why Uzbek has such a low status in Kyrgyzstan. 
 Kyrgyzstan has a wide variety of ethnic groups that comprise its population. The 
size of the Uzbek minority might lead one to believe that Uzbek should hold primary 
status in Kyrgyzstan but, unlike Russian, other factors that lead to language retention fit 
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the Russian case far better than the Uzbek case. In terms of linguistic and ideological 
factors that shape attitudes towards language, the history of Kyrgyzstan has a great effect. 
During the time of the Soviet Union, those who did not speak Russian were looked down 
upon. Both Kyrgyz and Uzbek were viewed as unnecessary and not as ‘elite’ languages.  
 Russian, unlike Uzbek, also provided and still provides a substantial amount of 
education and employment opportunities not presented by Kyrgyz. By learning Russian, 
an ethnic Kyrgyz has access to a wide array of literature, scientific and academic, not 
available in either Kyrgyz or Uzbek. The Russian-language schools in Kyrgyzstan also 
allow for better career placement, both in Russia and in Kyrgyzstan. The Russian 
language allows for students to get a better education in top fields such as law, health, 
and financing.  
 Finally, and what I think is most important, is how Kyrgyzstan shapes their 
foreign policy based on economy, security, and political alignment. Due to the shared 
history of the Soviet Union, and the lack of written history before that point, the Kyrgyz 
society is remarkably ‘Russified’. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan is becoming increasingly 
reliant on Russia for economic help (whether through aid or remittances). Kyrgyzstan is 
also dependent on Russia for military-related security, especially in regards to its 
southern border with Kyrgyzstan. Tensions have been high between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, especially since the 2010 revolution, and Kyrgyzstan relies on Russian 
military presence in its country to keep its sovereignty and people safe.  
 Kyrgyzstan’s continued acceptance of Russian as an official language is 
representative of its broader foreign policy goals. In the past few years, Kyrgyzstan has 
been shifting closer to Russia and, as such, needs to maintain positive relationships with 
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its larger northern neighbor. One way in which Kyrgyzstan maintains close relationships 
is by having Russian as an official language. Not only does this publically show 
Kyrgyzstan’s ties with Russia, but it also allows for the easier communication between 
the governments in Moscow and in Bishkek.  
 As Kyrgyz is the titular language, it will naturally retain its status as a state 
language. Due to the close economic, social, political and cultural ties between Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan, it seems unlikely that the Russian language will be restricted to a great 
extent, if at all. It is possible that Kyrgyz will slowly be used more, especially in 
domestic political affairs, but it is unlikely to completely eclipse Russian. It seems highly 
possible that Russian will retain dominance in pop media, higher education, science, and 
technology, unless stringent steps are taken against the Russian language at a federal 
level. 
 While the respective statuses of Russian and Kyrgyz are unlikely to change in 
Kyrgyzstan, further research could be done looking at other Central Asian states that have 
a more tumultuous relationship with Russia. This research could be useful in informing 
policy makers on the future of relations between Russia and the various Central Asian 
states in its ‘near abroad’. Additionally, the rising influence of China could be 
investigated. It seems that the Kyrgyz are attempting to use Russia to balance the rising 
Chinese power and influence, but the Russian-Chinese bilateral relationship in regards to 
their political game in the region could also be investigated. Finally, this thesis focused 
primarily on the three main languages of Kyrgyzstan. Further research could look at the 
presence of other languages, or lack thereof, including, but not limited to, Uighur, 
English, Arabic, Tajik, and Chinese.  
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